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Abstract
In parallel with the advances in big data-driven clinical research, the data safe haven concept has evolved over the last decade.
It has led to the development of a framework to support the secure handling of health care information used for clinical research
that balances compliance with legal and regulatory controls and ethical requirements while engaging with the public as a partner
in its governance. We describe the evolution of 4 separately developed clinical research platforms into services throughout the
United Kingdom-wide Farr Institute and their common deployment features in practice. The Farr Institute is a case study from
which we propose a common definition of data safe havens as trusted platforms for clinical academic research. We use this
common definition to discuss the challenges and dilemmas faced by the clinical academic research community, to help promote
a consistent understanding of them and how they might best be handled in practice. We conclude by questioning whether the
common definition represents a safe and trustworthy model for conducting clinical research that can stand the test of time and
ongoing technical advances while paying heed to evolving public and professional concerns.
(JMIR Med Inform 2016;4(2):e22)   doi:10.2196/medinform.5571
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Introduction
The challenges of secure electronic health care records reuse
and its trustworthiness are well recognized [1]. The international
clinical research community is nevertheless continually
recognizing the significance of big data for driving research and
deriving further benefit for patient care and outcomes [2,3].
While these challenges remain internationally applicable, we
focus in this paper on the recent experiences across the United
Kingdom to illustrate an ongoing dilemma and challenges
around the sharing and wider linkage of health and social care
records encouraged by the big data trend, and how established
protection strategies must continue to evolve to meet them.
In considering the ongoing dilemma, we discuss the paradigm
of the data safe haven (DSH) that has garnered increasing
interest across the UK research community. This paradigm is
a commonly recognized, state-of-the-art approach for handling
information derived from health care records in clinical research,
which has also achieved international recognition. While the
paradigm has developed to include a set of 12 criteria, including
the need to take account of societal concerns and anxieties when
handling data within any environment that claims to be a safe
haven [4], there remains work to be done to develop a more
inclusive definition of trustworthiness in this context,
specifically with regard to the public and its views on security
[5]. But what does the paradigm look like in practice and how
does it measure up against developing dilemmas and challenges
in the age of big data? We aim in this paper to answer this
question by discussing the practical experience of establishing
and running DSHs. With reference to a series of case studies
across the 4 nodes of the Farr Institute of Health Informatics
Research, which spans the United Kingdom, we build upon the
understanding that has developed around the DSH paradigm
and the need to apply a more developed and inclusive
understanding of trust as it applies to different stakeholders.
We use the case studies to identify comparable features of the
4 nodes as they have developed and evolved independently.
Using this and a detailed consideration of the legal, regulatory,
and information security requirements, we examine the
ramifications of their implementation in practice for clinical
research with regard to the established criteria. This provides a
basis to recommend an approach for fostering and nurturing
trust across stakeholders as the linkage trends and dilemmas
continue to evolve. We argue that the development of such trust
relies on the engagement with and involvement of the public in
the requisite governance and oversight of any system if it is to
be trusted. We emphasize that, in practical terms, the DSH
paradigm crucially must recognize that the management of risk
and support of trustworthy, careful working practice is not a
feature provided solely by encryption and access control
solutions, the physical security of data centers, or the control
of dataset release, but also by effective training, education, and
accreditation of the people using those systems so that they
understand how best they can work safely and securely, in
compliance with legal, regulatory, and ethical requirements.
While the focus of the work has been on the UK experience,
the discussion is intended to inform the identified challenges
of electronic health records reuse internationally.
The Big Data Dilemma
Big data in practice involves linking information from electronic
health care records with records contained in disease registries
and data generated by genome sequencing initiatives such as
the 100,000 Genomes Project [6] or the Electronic Medical
Records and Genomics Network [7]. The potential to link with
data collected from social care services has also been identified
as a key theme for research strategy [8], and there is
governmental support for both in terms of funding [9] and
legislative focus, for example, to aid health and social care
policy development [10].
This trend has been controversial, and anxieties about upholding
the medical profession’s duty of confidence to their patients,
protecting the patient’s right to a private life, and compliance
with data protection legislation have continued to emerge.
Studies that have explored attitudes toward using health and
other social care records for research point to general support
for research uses [11], which may, however, be conditional on
obtaining consent [12]. This must be taken in the context of an
identified “data trust deficit,” where the UK Royal Statistical
Society has found that people trust organizations’ (such as the
UK National Health Service, NHS) uses of data less than the
organizations themselves [13]. There have also been public
anxieties over the handling of initiatives such as the care.data
program in England [14] and more recently proposed initiatives
in Scotland [15]. Some concerns have been expressed about the
use of health record information for profit by industry [16], and
there is evidence to suggest that legal and regulatory compliance
may not be enough to win wider public and professional support
for all of the intended uses of information captured during health
care [17].
This apparent dilemma is compounded when viewed both from
the research—especially from the epidemiological—perspective,
where there is evidence that gaining explicit consent using opt-in
from participants reduces population sample sizes significantly
and can introduce selection bias [18-23], and from a realist
perspective, where gathering consent is not always possible or
rules out a firm basis on which to process data [22,24,25]. This
must be coupled with discoveries that research participants are
expecting greater transparency about [26] and a “louder voice”
in how research is conducted [27]. The dilemma is clearly one
that straddles both ethical and legal requirements and requires
balancing the rights of the individual—particularly around
autonomy—and the rights of the wider citizenry to benefit from
scientific progress [5].
In addition to this, and regardless of the measures taken to
protect participants as guided by the law and research ethics,
there remains some residual risk of harmful outcomes,
particularly if participants are accidentally or with some effort
deliberately re-identified within a research dataset. Methods to
render records anonymous cannot guarantee anonymity [28-30],
meaning that risks of participant re-identification, and therefore
of harm, remain. These risks are becoming recognized as being
more likely with genome research [27]. De-identification might,
however, not always be the best approach to take: in 2006 the
UK Academy of Medical Sciences identified in its report on
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using personal data in health research that meaningful research
needed varying degrees of identifiable data because “...most
important research using personal data requires access to
identifiable data at some point for some purpose...” [31]. This
issue has surfaced in practice, where de-identification is being
used as a means to limit disclosure and protect the
confidentiality of health care records at the expense of data
utility for research [32] and is an impediment to research itself
[33]. This is further illustrated when the risk of detrimental
effects to data quality and efficiency is heightened if disclosure
risk is handled in isolation. This is problematic in cases where
analytic strength needs to be “borrowed” from one data source
by another to realize its public benefit, where data being
borrowed can be processed without needless re-identification
provided its governance is not handled independently of the
borrower dataset [34].
A balance therefore needs to be found between the extent of
de-identification and the utility of data for research, which
reemphasizes the importance of handling these risks according
to legislated requirements and meaningfully supported, trusted,
careful, and secure working practice that works at scale. But
what does that entail in practice and, crucially, what extent is
needed to protect participants and the research community, and
also to meaningfully address public concerns while honoring
the rights of the individual?
What Is the Data Safe Haven Paradigm
and Where Did It Come From?
The concept of the DSH pertaining to the United Kingdom has
been developing since the early 1990s and continues to elude
a rigid or specific definition [4]. The garnering of the DSH
paradigm in the UK research community in particular is well
illustrated by the 2008 Data Sharing Review [35], which
emphasized the importance of handling health care data safely
and securely for research purposes. It recommended the
development of safe havens, which were identified as secure
working environments that required levels of accreditation for
researchers, as well as certification for data handling facilities
that were in line with high standards of information security.
The more recent Information Governance Review in 2013, in
which information-handling practices in England were
extensively reviewed by an independent, Department of
Health-appointed panel, has endorsed this recommendation
[36]. It identified the importance of the safe haven paradigm
and made further recommendations about levels of compliance
with existing codes of practice. These included the Information
Governance Toolkits across the UK jurisdictions, as well as
independent certification of compliance with standards such as
the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO)/International Electrotechnical Commission 27001 standard
on information security management [48]. The ISO standard
establishes the requirements for information security
management and helps to mold legal prescription into practical
tools for use in working practice. ISO 27001 offers an
opportunity for independent certification by ISO-accredited
information security experts, which in turn provides higher
levels of assurance around the security of certified systems.
In 2014, the Academy of Medical Sciences hosted a meeting
about DSHs in research to better understand what had been
developed and how they were working. The meeting identified
a need for developing a common definition of the DSH in
practice. Additionally, emphasis was placed on the importance
of developing these DSHs with due regard to providing
performance metrics and success criteria, research, training,
and educational needs, as well as understanding public
expectations by means of meaningful, ongoing engagement and
potential involvement [37]. By reviewing the state-of-the-art in
safe working practice for clinical research, the aim of the
meeting was to bring a common understanding to the wealth of
legislative, regulatory, and practical requirements that underpin
information governance in clinical research practice.
Since the 2014 meeting, commentary and discussion around
the understanding of the DSH paradigm have continued, and
evidence has emerged that this is becoming an internationally
recognized concept. Burton et al [4] have provided a set of 12
criteria to define the meaning of DSH. The criteria are focused
on trustworthiness and reliability of the data that are provided,
on upholding legal and ethical requirements, and on managing
and releasing data within the bounds of social acceptability.
The criteria also relate to maintaining the security of the data,
specifically around the preservation of confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of the data, and appropriate and secure access
to identifying data and their protection [4]. Knoppers and
Chadwick conclude that “[c]lear systems of governance, public
trust in data security, personal empowerment and the
responsibility it brings re ‘knowing’ (or not) as well as
transparency of research outcomes are to be welcomed...” [5].
They have further developed an understanding of the ethics
involved in this area and expanded the scope of
“trustworthiness” to include the public and its views on the
security of safe havens. In this paper, we consider these 12
criteria and the more inclusive scope defining trustworthiness
with a deeper discussion of legal, ethical, and risk management
requirements.
Bases in Law for Information Governance in Research
in the United Kingdom
We refer to the main acts of law and common law that are in
place to govern health research and protect information as it is
used for these purposes in the United Kingdom. We use the UK
legislature to describe the bases in law because we will discuss
implementations of the DSH paradigm in research platforms
across three jurisdictions in the United Kingdom: Wales,
Scotland, and England. To summarize, the bases in law stem
from a focus on protection of individuals and the definition of
professional duties with the common law duty of confidentiality
and its variations across UK jurisdictions. There are also
statutory provisions around consent for research and protections
for vulnerable groups in the Children Act 1989 [38] and the
Mental Capacity Act of 2005 [39], and for using biological
samples for research in the Human Tissue Act of 2004 [40].
The legislature further recognizes the right to a private life in
the Human Rights Act of 1998 [41]. The more data-focused
Data Protection Act of 1998 [42] defines statutory requirements
for handling data to protect the individuals about whom data
have been recorded, compliance with which is overseen by an
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Information Commissioner who has powers to fine organizations
for serious breaches. The Information Commissioner also
oversees compliance with European regulations regarding
electronic communications [43].
Further statutory provision exists in the form of the Health and
Social Care Act of 2012 [44], which provides a basis in law for
processing information to support health and social care services,
as well as the Health and Social Care Information Centre in
England, an organization responsible for handling health and
social care information and for gathering large research datasets,
which was originally identified as an accreditor of safe havens.
The Care Act of 2014 [45] defines the need for ethical approval
of health research via processes laid out by the Health Research
Authority in England and Wales, and requires that the Health
and Social Care Information Centre handle data with due regard
to privacy. Additional support in England and Wales lies in
Section 251 of the National Health Service Act of 2006 [46],
which empowers the Secretary of State for Health to set aside
the common law duty of confidentiality, where applicants must
show regulatory compliance and show a substantial public
interest for setting aside the common law, a power that in
Scotland lies with Caldicott Guardians, senior figures who
safeguard the confidentiality of patient data in the NHS and
enable appropriate information sharing. While this armory of
legal protections enforces the requirement of careful working
practice and processing that should not undermine reasonable
uses of health care data, it does not offer an immediate answer
to information reuse dilemmas, nor does it alter the risks of
re-identification in de-identified datasets. These legal protections
need both understanding and interpretation before uses of
information can be governed in practice.
Requirements and Motivations: Risk Management in
Practice
The legal requirements must nevertheless be enacted in practice.
Data Protection Act principle 7 requires data to be handled
securely; however, enacting this requirement in practice is not
a simple or trivial task. Perhaps the most authoritative resource
for developing information security management is the ISO
27000 series of standards [47]. Within this series the most
pertinent standards are 27001 (which defines the requirements
for information security) [48] and 27002 (which defines a code
of practice for implementation of the elements of ISO 27001)
[49]. An accredited ISO auditor can certify compliance with
27001 independently, while 27002 relies on an understanding
of and success criteria set by the organization that is
implementing the requirements established in 27001. This makes
it difficult to certify independently, but it is certainly internally
auditable. A prime example of ISO 27002 exists in the form of
the Information Governance Toolkits and their variations across
UK jurisdictions [50]. These have been developed to incorporate
requirements from legislation and good practice guidelines for
organizations that handle health care information and provide
a basis for establishing levels of compliance.
A key element of 27001 and its certification is to define the
scope of the security requirements. It then mandates the
development of an information security management system
(ISMS), which must be well supported by management and
responsible parties. The ISMS provides a basis for organizations
to run risk assessments and analyses on data use, and to refine
the findings into mitigation strategies that are developed in
policies for data use. These policies must be understood by the
people that they are supposed to govern and must define a basis
for configuration of software tools responsible for access control
and privilege management. There is a focus on engagement for
and with people working with information, which in turn
mandates that they should be well informed and guided in
working practice. Bearing in mind the particulars of security
practicalities, the safe haven concept is focused on mitigating
risks, whether risks to participants and their re-identification,
risks to organizations who process the data, risks to
organizations who have control and responsibility for the data,
or risks to continuing research and public appetite for the support
of research.
To summarize, ISO 27001 allows for an independently
certifiable process to show that organizations are compliant
with the internationally recognized core requirements of good
information security practice, while ISO 27002 provides a basis
to contextualize those core requirements through the Information
Governance Toolkits in the context of health care research.
Recognizing these criteria, the apparent evolution of the safe
haven concept has included work in the research community to
seek independent certification for compliance with ISO 27001
to provide additional practical security and support for research
communities as well as public reassurance. While these help
provide assurance that some of the 12 criteria provided by
Burton et al [4] are met, the extent to which this reassurance
supports trustworthiness remains unclear.
Requirements and Motivations in Context: Evolution
of the DSH Paradigm Through Information
Governance Research
The 2013 second Caldicott review of information governance
recognized that the research community had worked hard to
overcome perceived impediments of information governance
when handling health care information for purposes beyond
health care, that “significant lessons regarding data sharing from
public health and research” and “...the approach to information
governance adopted in public health and research may be
helpful...” to other sectors [36]. The next section focuses on the
experience of what this means in practice using 4 independently
developed examples of DSHs across the United Kingdom to
illustrate the practicalities and the need to involve and engage
with the wider public to satisfy their interest in research work
and understand their concerns over the use of health and social
care records.
We discuss the examples of the 4 nodes of the Farr Institute of
Health Informatics Research as small case studies to illustrate
the developing paradigm. The Farr Institute comprises 4 nodes
across the United Kingdom: one in Wales, one in Scotland, one
in the southeast of England, and one in the north of England.
The Institute was founded in 2013 and has incorporated a series
of research platforms that have been developed independently
of each other in partnership with research funders and local
NHS trusts and health boards. Each of these nodes has also
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developed and evolved its own information governance
frameworks, systems, and processes. The Welsh and Scottish
examples have achieved international recognition for their
initiatives [51], and the English examples have achieved
independent ISO certification in line with the recommendations
in the second Caldicott review. But do these examples represent
a common view of the original safe haven concept? We discuss
the 4 nodes in the next sections, which are structured according
to the common features identified across each node that have
emerged during the case studies.
Safe Havens in Research: Farr Institute
Node Case Study Examples
Farr Health eResearch Centre (North England)
Core Governance Framework
The Farr Institute Health eResearch Centre in north England is
a collaboration between 4 universities in the region, the NHS,
and industry. It is governed by a steering group that meets
periodically to develop and maintain strategy, as well as to
monitor performance of the Centre and its facilities. This
steering committee comprises senior representatives of the
universities involved with the Centre (including Liverpool,
Lancaster, and York), independent NHS representatives, users,
and industrial collaborators, as well as patients and members
of the public.
Independent Ethical Review, Certification, and User
Accreditation
The Centre will host a DSH at the University of Manchester,
where the equipment on which it is run is held within a
physically secure environment. This includes the infrastructure
for data storage, archiving, and networking that serves academic
research collaborators and includes connections to components
held within the NHS network. The safe haven is compliant with
the requirements of an ISO 27001 ISMS, where some
components have achieved independent certification and the
others are expected to have done so by early 2017. The NHS
networked component is compliant to level 2 of the Information
Governance Toolkit and is run within the governance framework
of the NHS. The safe haven and its use are governed by security
policies and standard operating procedures in line with the ISO
ISMS. Once projects have received required approved, the safe
haven provides both NHS users and researchers with secure
local and remote access to virtual machines that offer a suite of
analytics tools tailored to the analysis needs of their projects.
Cataloguing and Data Management
This suite of tools, termed the dLab (for data laboratory), will
provide researchers with a dataset catalogue, providing metadata
descriptions of data available within the safe haven environment.
The dLab will further provide desktop access to data,
applications, compute power, and storage, along with
appropriate authentication, authorization, and auditing
infrastructure. The safe haven offers additional features to link
datasets where appropriate permission has been granted and an
archiving feature for virtual machines on which analyses have
been run once the researchers have confirmed they are
completed. Additionally, an eLab data management facility [52]
will be provided to researchers. Where appropriate to the level
of sensitivity of data being accessed, both the dLab and eLab
components of the safe haven will provide remote desktop
access using 2-factor authentication. In the longer term, the
dLab software stack will be provided to the equivalents in the
other Farr Institute partners for exchange of scripts, data, and
research objects [53], with the potential for implementing a
single sign-on mechanism between Farr Institute partners. The
implementation of remote access is designed to reduce the need
for additional copying and physical transfer of data. Additional
facilities within the safe haven include a data deposit facility to
receive sensitive datasets on behalf of Farr Institute Health
eResearch Centre consortium members. Pseudonymized data
can be received from NHS partners through periodic data feeds
via the N3 network, again mitigating any need for excess
copying or physical transportation of data.
Future Ambitions and Developing Protection:
Opportunities for Public Involvement
In addition to existing approvals requirements, the Centre is
working toward establishing an independent governance board,
comprising both expert and lay members, to review research
project proposals and approve them before the researchers can
have access to the tools and datasets that they need to answer
their research questions. The Centre intends to make any
approvals dependent on the governance board’s assessment of
the scientific validity of the project’s proposed research
questions in combination with the results of independent ethics
reviews. The governance board will also approve the researchers
themselves, and this relies on ensuring the researchers have
undertaken information governance training as required by the
standard operating procedures.
Farr Centre for Improvement in Population Health
through E-records Research (Wales)/Secure
Anonymised Information Linkage Databank
Governance Framework
The Centre for Improvement in Population Health through
E-records Research (CIPHER) (Wales) node of the Farr Institute
uses the Secure Anonymised Information Linkage (SAIL)
Databank at Swansea University. Conceptualized in 2006, SAIL
has since been evolving continually. At the heart of the SAIL
model was and is the need to find and maintain a balance
between preserving individual-level privacy and harnessing the
potential to use health-related data to their full potential for the
benefit of public health [54]. Seven essential objectives were
set: secure data transportation, reliable data matching between
datasets, robust anonymization and encryption, disclosure
control, data access controls, scrutiny of data utilization
proposals, and external verification of compliance with
information governance. SAIL has developed in partnership
with NHS Wales and continual consultation with the Welsh
Government, regulatory bodies, and professional and public
groups.
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Independent Ethical Review, Certification, and User
Accreditation: Opportunities for Public Involvement
SAIL insists on data sharing agreements being in place between
SAIL and all data providers. Through the SAIL gateway, data
are provided to each project on a predetermined basis. All
research proposals are submitted to an independent information
governance review panel, which includes representation from
the British Medical Association, Public Health Wales, NHS
Wales Informatics Service (NWIS), National Research Ethics
Committee, and the public (members of the Consumer Panel
for Data Linkage Research). Approval is given only if the
research is appropriate and in the public interest, and the
research can proceed only on receipt of full approval from this
panel. Project analysts are then assigned permissions within the
SAIL gateway to match the independent information governance
review panel application, with access controlled through an
automated security system. Project-specific data views are
created to provide tailored data subsets.
All persons accessing the SAIL gateway have to be approved
researchers (have undergone accredited training) and are
required to sign a comprehensive data access agreement about
their use of the data in SAIL. The research is carried out within
the SAIL secure gateway environment. Results can be taken
out only via a request process, which involves scrutiny by SAIL
senior analysts for information governance issues, such as small
cell counts, and other breaches of the SAIL output release
policy.
Access to the SAIL databank is remote, via a firewalled virtual
private network known as the SAIL gateway. It uses enhanced
user authentication, auditing of all SQL commands, and
configuration controls to ensure that data cannot be removed
or transferred unless authorized.
Cataloguing and Data Management
Robust anonymization is provided by a trusted third party,
NWIS. All data are transferred using Web-based secure file
upload facilities, with incoming datasets being split into a
demographic component (personally identifiable information)
and a clinical or event component. The demographic component
is sent to NWIS, which then assigns an anonymous linking field
to each individual, thus ensuring anonymity and encryption.
The clinical component is sent to SAIL. At SAIL, the
anonymous linking field is linked to the clinical or event data
and reencrypted.
Future Ambitions and Developing Protection
SAIL is engaged in a constant program of improvement and
has moved to a purpose-built data science building, which will
also house the Administrative Data Research Network. The
physical security for the new data science building will be
configured such that it will accommodate successfully the
physical security requirements for all projects and research
programs based within the building, including the storage of
Administrative Data Research Centre for Wales de-identified
government data (classified to official/official sensitive)
requiring the highest level of security (security zone 5) within
the building. The external ISO 27001:2013 ISMS certification
process for the SAIL program was completed in November
2015.
Farr Scotland/Scottish Health Informatics Programme
Governance Framework
The Scottish node of the Farr Institute builds on the progress
and success of the Scottish Health Informatics Programme
(SHIP), which ran from 2009–2013. Through SHIP, a principled
proportionate governance model was developed in order to
streamline research applications and approvals for data linkage,
while simultaneously ensuring that research was scientifically
sound and ethically robust. Risk mitigation played a central role
within the SHIP model, and access to health data for research
was contingent on performing a privacy risk assessment and
meeting the benchmarks of safe people, safe environments, and
safe data, as described by Sethi and Laurie [55]. Farr Scotland
[56] is building on these contributions (and requirements) from
SHIP in tandem with the Scotland-wide Data Linkage
Framework, the Scottish Informatics Linkage Collaboration,
National Records of Scotland’s Registrar General, and the
Administrative Data Research Centre.
Independent Ethical Review, Certification, and User
Accreditation: Cataloguing and Data Management
Access to the national safe haven and national data (located at
the NHS National Services Scotland) is provided via the
electronic Data Research and Innovation Service. This service
assigns (approved) researchers (who have undergone accredited
training) to a dedicated research coordinator who offers support
for the process of submission of the initial data access
application (including study design and coding) right through
to data analysis. All data uses must abide by the key benchmarks
set out under SHIP. The research coordinator also acts as an
intermediary between data controllers and researchers, who
must all abide by the Guiding Principles for Data Linkage
established by the Scottish Government. Streamlined approval
for access to more than one NHS board dataset for research
purposes was granted by the Privacy Advisory Committee for
Scotland which, as of May 1, 2015, is to be subsumed under
the new Public Benefit and Privacy Panel for Health and Social
Care.
The Scottish Government is leading the establishment of
procedures to provide independent accreditation of safe havens
(safe settings), mechanisms for monitoring compliance (safe
projects), guidance on coding, terminology, and disclosure (safe
outputs), and the development of training for researchers (safe
people). A significant challenge for the Farr Institute is that
Scotland lacks legislation “defining the status of accredited safe
havens, but the review of the Patients’ Rights Act, due in 2016,
may provide an opportunity to make clear in law the status of
the safe havens” [57].
Future Ambitions and Developing Protection:
Opportunities for Public Involvement
The Farr Institute will be embedded within a network of safe
havens, which includes the NHS National Services Scotland
national safe haven and 4 lead NHS Research Scotland nodes.
Quite what this network will look like and how it will operate
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is still very much under development. The national safe haven
currently consists of 2 stand-alone computer terminals that
accredited researchers can access remotely via a secure network
or server.
The recent Scottish Government report A Health and Biomedical
Informatics Research Strategy for Scotland [58] considers the
potential and challenges involved with establishing such a
network of safe havens. It has identified the following key
challenges in order to facilitate interoperability between safe
havens: technical challenges, the practical details of how a
network of safe havens should operate, and determining whether
a single point of entry should be necessitated (or whether there
can be multiple points of entry). On this latter issue, a balance
must be achieved between having a single point of entry, and
support and provision of local expertise for researchers. Indeed,
additional safe havens may be established, and the question
arises as to whether these safe havens can join the network and,
if so, which standards and accreditation procedures they will
be subject to. In this vein, a Safe Haven Charter for Scotland
(based on the core principles of ISO 27001) is being developed,
which will include a set of high-level principles around
technical, practical, and overarching governance considerations
[59]. The biggest challenge will be striking a further balance
between determining and meeting common and consistent data
standards while facilitating flexibility between local nodes. Farr
Scotland has a dedicated work stream committed to civic
engagement and will strive to explore and feed in to governance
approaches and public attitudes around such uses of data.
Farr London
Core Governance Framework
The London node of the Farr Institute is a collaboration between
University College London, the London School of Hygiene &
Tropical Medicine, and Queen Mary University of London. The
DSH has been established within the School of Life and Medical
Sciences at University College London as an identifiable data
handling service, comprising a technical solution for the secure
storage of identifying or pseudonymized data, and a service
within which the technical solution is mapped that provides
individual health research projects guidance on how to develop
their own working practices and achieve Information
Governance Toolkit compliance.
Independent Ethical Review, Certification, and User
Accreditation
The research projects running within the Farr London node are
subject to their own contractual obligations with data providers,
as well as independent ethical approvals and oversight, where
any changes to approved information handling, linkage, or wider
sharing must be authorized by the ethics committee that provided
the original approvals via University College London, the
London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, or Queen
Mary University of London boards, or the NHS research ethics
committees, where needed.
The technical solution comprises a “walled garden” approach,
which uses secured virtual sessions run from within a secure
infrastructure. This element has achieved ISO 27001:2013
certification and is audited annually by accredited ISO auditors.
All steps use a 2-factor authentication, and the session forbids
any download of data (including copying and pasting and some
screen capture). All projects are logically segregated from each
other within the safe haven, and access is controlled and
permitted only to those users who have been registered and
attended information governance awareness training courses,
as well as completed online information governance tests
annually for their reaccreditation.
The identifiable data handling service provides guidance on
how to achieve appropriate levels of Information Governance
Toolkit compliance, preparation for seeking Section 251
exemption from the common law duty of confidentiality where
applicable, and wider information security framework
development, including the drafting and execution of data
sharing agreements and codes of practice. The identifiable data
handling service also routinely tours the partner institutions
with awareness sessions and runs training courses and the online
annual information governance reaccreditation tests for
registered users. In addition to this, the identifiable data handling
service is governed by a user group, which routinely meets and
offers usage feedback to the School of Life and Medical
Sciences, and an executive project board, which oversees
budgeting and approves the execution of upgrades and changes
to the service and systems. The outreach to the user community
is tailored to help them understand the security and good practice
requirements and the change in working behavior within this
managed environment.
Cataloguing and Data Management
The technical solution also includes a patient indexing service,
which is based on bespoke de-identification and record linkage
software developed by Belgian security company Custodix [60].
This service allows for datasets to be anonymized or
pseudonymized where appropriate, so that these datasets can
be securely shared under any required authorization with other
Farr Institute nodes or authorized research collaborators. The
linkage software can merge records across different projects
held within the safe haven where this is permissible.
Functionality includes a feature where clinical data sources are,
on registration, able to upload identifiable datasets securely
using a dedicated upload service. Research project recipients
are then able to access the uploaded data and transfer it to a
suite of licensed database and analytical tools over a secure
virtual session.
Future Ambitions and Developing Protection:
Opportunities for Public Involvement
The identifiable data handling service is considering the
establishment of an ethics oversight committee to include a
panel of researchers, clinical and legal expertise, and
involvement from patient groups or members of the public to
help consider any ad hoc collaborations across research projects
or wider interventions.
Discussion
A Common Paradigm?
Across the 4 Farr Institute nodes, common features of the
information governance frameworks have been developed. In
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all cases, there is a recognized compliance with the Information
Governance Toolkit or the Scottish equivalent. The English
nodes have been certified to ISO 27001, and the CIPHER node
received certification in November 2015. Each node comprises
or is in the process of establishing a series of committees and
panels for oversight, development, and governance, with some
cases including public and lay representation. Each node also
requires that researchers undertake training and education before
they can use the facilities.
The following appear to be consistent features for a safe haven
across the Farr partners that build upon the 12 criteria offered
by Burton et al [4] and the need identified by Knoppers and
Chadwick [5] for expanding the definition of trust to include
the wider public and their trust in security:
1. Independent certification for establishing good working
practice, which includes a focus on people and behaviors when
handling information and the development of steering
committees and working groups
2. Training, education, and accreditation of people who work
within the environment, including assessment and professional
certification
3. Working practice within the prescription of jurisdictional
legislative relief, which includes reviews by ethics committees
for research activities
4. Cataloguing and data management, which includes an updated
resource for defining not only what data are available, but also
the requirements for using them in research within these
environments
5. Participant contact for research or appropriate exemptions
under the law
6. Developments in protection and future ambitions
7. Opportunities for public engagement and involvement,
including events and workshops to disseminate research
findings, as well as having lay representation on panels, steering
committees, and working groups. This helps ensure that the
public have a voice in the policy, use, and development of the
infrastructure.
Is This Enough?
Our proposed common definition illustrates the key aspects for
developing the DSH paradigm into trusted platforms for clinical
research. It emphasizes that we must implement and maintain
concrete examples of what is safe in terms of protecting
participants and researchers, and what is trusted by those same
participants, funders, the academic research community, and
the wider public. This common definition builds on the criteria
established by Burton et al [4] and takes into account the need
for a more inclusive understanding of what is meant by trust,
reinforcing the proposals of Knoppers and Chadwick [5]. This
work further develops these themes and findings by providing
not only exemplars of how these aspects are established in
practice, but also a proposed framework for the ongoing
evolution away from the static notion of the safe haven as a
physical environment alone. It is moving the understanding
toward a trusted research platform that handles societal,
individual, and professional concerns, and offers reassurance
and the opportunity to govern its operation beyond the research
and regulatory communities. It supports the notion that an
environment view must also include the people who work in,
govern, and contribute to that environment, and their support.
Trust must be won and nurtured, and it will vary according to
the stakeholders who are involved in doing research, or indeed
about whom the data have been collected; this relies on
involvement and informed dialogue.
Such a requirement will not be met by focusing on the integrity,
reliability, or security of the technical solutions within the
platforms themselves in isolation from the training needs of the
researchers and their education of what good working practice
entails. Nor can this in turn be handled in isolation from
independent ethical oversight of how data can be used, or
without encouraging and supporting lay representation on
steering groups for the platforms or research consortia that use
them. The provenance of the data themselves must provide
assurance to the research community that the data are fit for the
purposes of their research, but cannot be the focus of efforts
without ensuring that they are adequately catalogued. Critically,
none of these aspects can be isolated from ongoing public
engagement and education, which involves a 2-way
communication between the academic research community and
the public about how information is used and what the benefits
are.
To fully articulate what we mean by safe and trusted, we must
reemphasize that at the core of the DSH paradigm is the notion
of risk management. We have discussed how risks of participant
identification remain regardless of the methods used to render
records anonymous, and we have highlighted that the research
community needs more identifiable attributes for realistic utility
and should not handle risk management across datasets in
isolation, at the cost of reasonable use and sharing. The DSH
paradigm is ultimately about managing those risks, so no basis
for an open dialogue with the public or their meaningful
involvement can take place without being transparent about the
existence of those risks. But the DSH approach does not
guarantee, and nor should it, that risks will not remain; rather,
they operate within an independently certified environment that
will more likely be able to adapt to the changing nature of
known and emerging risks, with due respect to interest from
the public and their concerns, and ongoing mindfulness of the
ethics around the research, its data use, and its outputs. Such
environments are made up as much of people and their actions
as of hardware, software, and policies.
It is for individual members of the public to decide how they
feel about the ways in which information recorded about them
is being looked after, and while they do not always get a say in
whether information is shared for purposes other than their
direct care, the DSH paradigm must emphasize the importance
of highlighting the benefits of the information sharing in spite
of the risks of re-identification, at the very least to give people
an opportunity to develop an informed opinion, rather than
erroneously guaranteeing them a risk-free solution. To win the
trust of any stakeholder, this means that we must encourage
shared ownership of the problem with the public and patient
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communities while being transparent and open about how health
information is used and why it is important that it is being used.
Conclusions
We have described the motivations behind developing the DSH
paradigm to support the big data, epidemiological research drive.
In doing so, we have discussed the basis for the paradigm and
introduced a series of requirements from a legal, ethical, and
information security perspective, building on established work
in this area. We have emphasized that these alone do not
represent clear public anxieties about and interest in how
research is conducted and information is protected. Through
this discussion, we have proposed a common definition of the
DSH paradigm by considering and describing the technical
infrastructure, ethical oversight, researcher training and
education process, the internal governance, and external,
independent audit and public engagement and involvement
drives of 4 independently established clinical research platforms
and the common features among them.
We have critically reviewed the proposed definition by
emphasizing the importance of involving the public and
engaging with them openly and transparently, especially with
regard to risks or re-identification and how the risks are
managed. The focus of the DSH paradigm cannot be solely on
technical or procedural approaches to risk mitigation.
Engagement with people is paramount, and not exclusively with
the public but also the researchers who use the platforms
underpinned by the DSH paradigm. This includes responding
to their educational needs and supporting their ability to do the
research with guidance on ethical requirements and due
diligence for understanding funder requirements. It is
particularly vital to understand the needs and expectations of
all these stakeholders if the clinical research community is to
inspire trust in their research platforms. While this paper has
focused on experiences across the United Kingdom, the findings
will be of interest internationally to help manage the challenges
that exist for electronic health records reuse in clinical research.
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CIPHER: Centre for Improvement in Population Health through E-records Research
DSH: data safe haven
ISMS: information security management system
ISO: International Organization for Standardization
NHS: National Health Service
NWIS: NHS Wales Informatics Service
SAIL: Secure Anonymised Information Linkage
SHIP: Scottish Health Informatics Programme
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